

# Procedural preferences between majority and supermajority rules in judgment aggregation

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## 1 Aim

It has been well known that the aggregation of group members' judgments on logically interconnected issues often result in the collective inconsistency even if each member's judgment is logically consistent. The theory of judgment aggregation has proposed some decision-making procedures to avoid the collective inconsistency. One is to derive the collective outcome from collective judgments on a subset of issues. The premise- and conclusion-based procedures, which are based on issue-wise majority rules, have been intensively studied (e.g., List 2005). The other is to rely on the supermajority rule (List 2014). However, individuals' preferences over such decision-making procedures have been less examined empirically. Bonnefon (2010) have already investigated how goal framing and logical structures of agenda affect individuals' preferences between premise- and conclusion-based procedures. This study examines under what conditions the supermajority rule is more likely to be favored in judgment aggregation.

## 2 Methods

This study conducted scenario-based experiments among randomly selected panel members of MyVoice Communications, Inc. After the scenario describing the group decision-making with the occurrence of the collective inconsistency were shown, participants were asked to evaluate the above-mentioned three collective decision-making procedures.

## 3 Results

I found that the supermajority rule was more likely to be favored in scenarios where the outcome through the supermajority rule was different from that through other two procedures.

## 4 Conclusion

This finding can be interpreted that participants basically admitted the superiority of majority rule to the supermajority rule in terms of simplicity while recognizing the significance of the supermajority rule.

## References

- Bonnefon JF (2010) Behavioral evidence for framing effects in the resolution of the doctrinal paradox. *Social Choice and Welfare* 34: 631–641.
- List C (2005). The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions. *Social Choice and Welfare* 24: 3–32.
- List C (2014) When to defer to supermajority testimony – and when not. In J. Lackey (ed.), *Essays in Collective Epistemology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.